

DATA EXCHANGE DEMO

Share data while retaining control and confidentiality of your data

Version 2020-04-29

Gains and difficulties of sharing confidential data

\+ Access to non-public data.

\+ Potential new research and collaborations.

\- More work to manage confidential data.



≈ Possible to gain new insights.

\- Risks on privacy and security.

\- Additional work without direct return on investments (ROI).

⚠ Gain is usually with the data requester, burden is with the data provider

Willingness to share data

ROI **+** ***Trust***

Return on Investment (ROI) is determined by the balance between effort it takes to share data, and the gain received by sharing data

Trust is determined by the balance between the risks (due to privacy or competition), and the control (due to verification and security) of sharing and usage of data



Type of Data Owners

Data aggregators

Health care (Palga, NZa)
Social-economic (CBS, municipalities)

Hospitals + medical institutions

Hospital (AMC, vuMC, St. Antonius)
Insurance companies (Zilveren Kruis)

Onderzoekers + universiteiten

Universities (Twente, Wageningen, Groningen)
Researchers

Bedrijven

Friesland-Campina, Elsevier

Privacy sensitive

Competitive data

Example: Find the average income

Run #1

- 21 people
- Algorithm verified
- Outcome guaranteed not to be traceable to individual people

Run #2

- 22 people (same 21 and 1 other)
- Algorithm verified
- Outcome guaranteed not to be traceable to individual people

Even if individual runs are fine, combining two runs may reveal confidential data

Different Methods to Ease Data Sharing

Agreements

- Stipulation of what can/cannot be done
- Signing of contract or NDA
- Dispute resolution process

Registration

- Authentication
- Verification of credential
- Reputation score
- Policy framework
- Audit trails

Pseudonymization

- Filtering (on records)
- Pruning (on properties)
- Aggregation (combine records)
- Make coarse grained buckets
- Slight alteration of data
- One-way hashing
- One-time identifiers
- Synthetic data (mix records)

Data Vault

- Data source retains control
- Delegate permissions
- No central data lake
- Data marketplace

Secure Containers

- Bring algorithm to data
- At Trusted third party or at data provider
- Share output instead of data

Secure Computing

- Secure multi-party computation
- Homomorphic encryption
- Garbled Circuits
- Zero-knowledge proof

Data Exchange



Collaborating without direct Sharing Data



Workflow

Share data	Data provider shares data with trusted third party; Researcher shares algorithm with trusted third party;
Request	Researcher makes request to data provider;
Verify algorithm	Data provider verifies requester and algorithm; ... and selects data set(s);
Run	Trusted third party creates secure container; ... mounts algorithm and data set; ... executes algorithm;
Curate output	Data provider verifies output and algorithm behaviour;
Release output	Once released, the researcher receives the output.

Permission Models

One-off permission	Trust a researcher	Run on a data stream
The data provider permits a researcher to **run** a specific algorithm **once** on a specific dataset.	The data provider permits a researcher to **run any algorithm on a specific dataset**. The permission can be revoked at any time. Example use cases: • the data provider trust the researcher to always write benevolent code • the researchers wants to tweak the algorithm, and run it on a sample dataset every time.	The data provider permits a researcher to **run a specific algorithm on any data set in a selected folder**. Every time a new dataset is added to the folder, the algorithm is automatically run. The permission can be revoked at any time, but is also automatically revoked as soon as a change to the shared algorithm is detected.

Currently supported permission models

Implementation (Proof of Concept)

- Working prototype
- Non-production (not scalable nor fast, not rigorously tested)
- Data stored at ResearchDrive (OwnCloud implementation at SURF for researchers)
- Data sharing: https://dataexchange.surfsara.nl/
  (simple password to emphasis it is a demonstration only: demo / dex)
- **Goal is to understand user requirements**


Mike Kotsur


Rienk Koenders


Sijmen Schoon


Tijs Teulings


Sander van Wickeren


Axel Berg


Hylke Koers


Gerben van Malenstein


Freek Dijkstra

bit

Technical Implementation of the prototype



External integrations

Internal Components

Risks and Mitigations

Risk	Mitigation
Data is leaked to outside world	Researcher can never view the raw data, only the result
Data is used in other ways than intended	Data provider can review algorithm
Algorithm is leaked to outside world	Algorithm is not reviewed by data provider, researcher is trusted to write benevolent code only *
Output contains confidential information	Data provider curates output before releasing it to researcher
Malicious algorithm tries to copy data to remote server	No network access is allowed in secure container
Malicious algorithm tries to embed data in output	Data provider can review algorithm
Algorithm is altered after it is shared	Permissions involving this algorithm are automatic revoked
Researcher can no longer be trusted	Permission can be revoked by data provider at any time
Trusted third party can no longer be trusted	Sharing of data to trusted third party can be revoked at any time
Data is corrupt or data provider can no longer be trusted	Researcher should look for other data sources
Data can’t leave premises, not even to a trusted third party	Secure container can be run at premises of data provider *

* Not yet implemented in the prototype



Data is shared with the Data exchange



Algorithm is shared with the Data exchange by researcher



Researcher makes a request to the data provider



Data provider reviews request and selects dataset



Trusted Third Party runs algorithm on dataset



Data provider reviews output



Researcher can see released output



Data provider can at any time withdraw permissions

Related Projects

ODISSEI Secure Supercomputer (OSSC)

- In production
- Processes CBS micro-data on Cartesius
- Does pseudonymization as well



AMdEX

- Collaboration of interested parties
- Initiated by Amsterdam Economic Board
- Goal is to build an infrastructure for multiple Data Marketplaces

Partnership Questions

- Who may benefit from a data exchange?
  - Are there researchers that want to use confidential data?
  - Who are the data providers in this case?
  - Under what conditions would these data providers release their data?
- What should the role of SURF?
  - Service provider; software developer; community manager; …
- Should SURF turn this prototype into a pilot?
- Are there other projects we should collaborate with?

Technical Questions

- Is a trusted third party the right approach?
- What is the trust relation?
  - Does the data provider trust the researcher?
  - Does the data provider trust the algorithm?
- More advances user scenarios (e.g. with 3 parties):
  - Patient trust a hospital with their data
  - Hospital trust a researcher with the patient data
  - What are the implications for the current demo with 2-part user-scenario?
  - Who gives what permissions, and is that a continuous permission? How to withdraw permissions?



COLLABORATION WITHOUT SHARING DATA

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Driving innovation together

SURF